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explore the ontological relationship between beauty and goodness, but hope to indicate the problems that arise when they are separated.
The common intuition that beauty and goodness are linked in some way hints at the under-developed notion that there is a metaphysical ground to the human experiences of beauty and goodness. The Greek linguistic innovation -Kalagathos (beauty/goodness) -reflects this intuition as it captures much more than a sociopolitical attribution of worth which seems the common currency of modernity. 5 This is the fruitful speculative kernel from which St. Thomas (or at least the Thomists)
arrive at the transcendental nature of beauty and goodness. Nevertheless, the close relationship of beauty and goodness contemplated by the Greeks, spiritualized by the Victorines and achieving its apotheosis in the Thomists is not without its difficulties.
Beauty and goodness come apart, and too often. Art, indeed, presents us with many 4
Deontology is excluded as a criterion for the examination conducted here since traditionally, it is heavily anthropocentric (even though it can be admitted that Tom Regan attempts to bring contemporary Deontology to task on environmental issues). Indeed, Kant thinks the only reason for not harming animals is that it may result in actions 'bad to the neighbour.' Aside from the merits or demerits of deontology, the scope of this paper requires the consideration of the major lines of ethical argument affecting this question. If pigs could fly, should they? A sketch of Utilitarian and Natural Law arguments against 'Life Science Art.' examples of 'infernal' beauty. Perhaps Plato was right to seek the prohibition of art that did not service morality. However, it seems too narrow a view to suppose that an art work expressing an infernal beauty ought to be rejected as art because of its immoral content. A beautiful depiction of a rape, a torture, a paedophilic act, no matter how we might morally be repelled at the content of the acts depicted (whether in painting, literature or film) nonetheless may well represent excellences as art, and may thus be considered beautiful. 6 The notion of disinterestedness emphasized by the Kantians yields an account of art works as embodying aesthetic qualities independent of the morality of the subject matter. A Kantian perspective can recognize that art and morality, beauty and goodness are in principle separable. This in turn has lead to the increasing abstractness of contemporary art, as art is increasingly divorced from the world of nature in which beauty and goodness are instantiated. How these considerations apply to 'science/art' has added a new dimension to the polemics of the 'philosophy of art.'
Various forms of specialisation have become commonplace in contemporary life, but the blurring of the distinction between science and art revealed by 'Life Science Art' questions the relations between these two fields of endeavour. 'Life Science Art' projects utilise the skills and insights of both fields producing that which can be conceived as having either intrinsic value (traditionally aligned with art) or extrinsic value (traditionally aligned with the products of science). 7 Admittedly, scientists and artists have collaborated in the past to further their particular goals. Indeed, in some instances, the scientist and the artist were one and the same person: Sir Joseph Banks and Leonardo Da Vinci are two examples of this. However, the shared enterprise that 'Life Science Art' embodies is different in kind to former modes of collaboration.
Formerly, the goals, materials and techniques of the artist and the scientist were distinct. The artist would assist the scientist by creating accurate (and in some instances extremely life like) depictions of the matter under scientific scrutiny. The   6 This need not mean, of course, that the artwork depicting rape, torture or paedophilia would be banned, but only that such depictions would occur within the context of a larger moral objective, perhaps by placing such depictions within the context of the moral disintegration of a personality.
7
"Life Science Art" takes its form in conjunction with science in its pragmatic and practical dimensions and thus this mode of science is under consideration here. Pure science, which is of a different order and thus subject to different considerations in the measure of its worth is not discussed.
If pigs could fly, should they? A sketch of Utilitarian and Natural Law arguments against 'Life Science Art.' key here is that the artist created depictions of the natural whereas the work of the scientist discovered and analysed the natural. The goal of the artist was arguably of a second order-artistic interpretation (accurate or otherwise) of the natural, (usually) imbued with meaning. On the other hand, the scientist's goal was of the first orderinseparable from the natural realm, and primarily functional. With the advent of 'Life Science Art' the nature of this partnership has changed. Not only have 'scientific tools and protocols …become an integral part of the artistic process' but the essence and purpose of these crafts have been confused: the artist conducts experiments and the scientist creates depictions, or distortions, of the natural.
8 Therefore, one of the difficulties with 'Life Science Art' is its inability to function clearly as either art or science.
To fully understand the notion of 'Life Science Art' one must not only analyse the creations themselves, but the motivating forces and goals at work in their production, and their place within the realm of the proficiencies of humanity. Thus, it could be that 'Life Science Art' is best understood with reference to the Greek term poiesis (making), which encapsulates a dimension of thought that modernity has been less than sensitive to. Art is but one aspect in the history of human making and the Greek term poiesis conveys this wider context. Works of art are examples of human making which are situated in the broader framework of the technai (crafts) and also intimately related to science as craft. When considered from this perspective, rather than seeing art as an autonomous realm of human activity or making with its own criteria of value, it becomes reintegrated into a less clearly demarcated field of activity, with more extensive evaluative criteria. The parallel judgment of art and science in the ancient world was made possible by the integration of these concepts under the banner of technai. If pigs could fly, should they? A sketch of Utilitarian and Natural Law arguments against 'Life Science Art.' aspirations seem to be misplaced. On the other hand, if defended as having intrinsic value, the merit of the art is diminished by it being coupled with scientific objectives.
It is difficult to categorise the key elements of 'Life Science Art' practice. However, the commonalities seem generally to include three aspects: software, hardware and 'wetware.' 9 These terms denote the computer programming, the equipment (such as machinery, circuitry, computers and life-support apparatus) and organic matter, respectively. Further distinctions can be made within the field, between projects that employ the use of different kinds of organic matter: living or non-living tissue which can in turn be derived from plants and animals, including humans. These distinctions will become clear following the discussion of individual 'Life Science Art' projects.
Common to all of these projects is the manipulation of life forms with respect to artistic goals. As instances of 'Life Science Art,' all these projects succumb to evaluative and functional difficulties incurred by the blurring of the art/science distinction. These works also share, to different degrees, in the moral difficulties associated with 'Life Science Art.' Some are ethically problematic in terms of contemporary Utilitarianism since they seem to disregard the suffering of sentient beings, and are thus representative of the way in which some forms of life are arbitrarily excluded from moral calculus. In terms of Natural Law, these project are questionable since the production of art is a) not a 'sufficiently serious reason' to cause harm b) because they fail to fulfil the telos of either art or science and c) because they are offensive to an ontology which views the cosmos, at least in part, in terms of natural kinds. Unfortunately for Kac, his plans were thwarted at the last minute by the director of the institute, and the rabbit remained in the lab. If pigs could fly, should they? A sketch of Utilitarian and Natural Law arguments against 'Life Science Art.' the use of mechanical motion sensitive 'armour' encrusted with metal spikes, which closes when people approach the work at exhibitions. 21 This project may be the least problematic of those given consideration here, since it is restorative in orientation (albe-it in an artificial manner) and does not infringe on any sentient being which can be argued to have interests in its own welfare, at least form Utilitarian perspectives.
As strange as these projects may seem, 'Life Science Art' advocates declare that they are 'not playing God, only evolution.' 22 As Dr Stuart Bunt, of the University of Western Australia, points out, given that humanity has been genetically altering plants and animals for centuries (by manipulation of the gene pool through plant and animal husbandry) experimental and artistic work manipulating the same materials should be acceptable. The problems with this position are twofold. Firstly, it is too great a generalization to posit that since man has imposed some changes upon the plant and animal kingdoms in the past that all future manipulation should be welcomed. One would not agree, on similar grounds that since slavery was successful in some respects (for example economic) in the past, that it should be continued. The status quo is not above ethical reproach. Secondly, since one of the main drives behind 'Life Science Art' is to test our intuitions surrounding the boundaries of biotechnology, genetic manipulation, art and ethics, that is, the status quo, it seems odd that those engaging in this art form should wish to bring the status quo to their defence.
Utilitarian Arguments
Another way in which some seek to justify 'Life Science Art' projects is demonstrated in the following line of argument: Dr Bunt posed the question to the gathered crowd: "There is nothing wrong with using animals for scientific purposes, and we value art more highly than science, so why shouldn't we use animals in art?" It is assumed that the phrasing of the question was designed for rhetorical effect, and the point Dr Bunt was putting to his audience is treated with some charity in its reformulation here.
If pigs could fly, should they? A sketch of Utilitarian and Natural Law arguments against 'Life Science Art.' P3: We now use animals and animal tissues in art.
P4: We value art more highly than scientific experiments. C: Therefore it is acceptable to use animals in art. 24 Premises one and three are uncontroversial, on the basis of practice. The soundness of premises two and four and the conclusion derived there from debatable and can be countered on a number of fronts.
That 'it is acceptable to use animals in scientific experimentation' is a contentious claim, for many moral philosophers do take issue with the use of animals in scientific experimentation, but the practice is tolerated on pragmatic grounds. Further, it seems that animal experimentation is seen as morally questionable by the scientific community, since experimentation is only allowed within restraints. In Australia, these restraints are made explicit in the ' Note, that for the conclusion to follow, the degree to which something is valued and the degree to which it can be deemed moral must be correlated, which the authors assume was Dr Bunt's meaning. admitting that the attraction of this art form is that it allows the evasion of the good practice they employ in their defence. The current scientific culture works within the guidelines of best practice with the aim of bringing those who involve malpractice in their work to account. The pursuit of freedom from these constraints leads to the objection that this may be considered as the pursuit of malpractice. The accusation of malpractice is cleverly avoided, however, when the name of the practice changed from 'science' to 'Life Science Art'. Thus it seems that 'Life Science Art' is a grey area as far as best practice is concerned, which suggests that it, and other art forms using animals in their production, should conform to a code of practice designed specifically for their regulation.
Further, the claim that the use of animals in scientific experimentation is acceptable is readily countered from within a number of philosophical traditions; arguments from
Utility will serve to demonstrate. If pigs could fly, should they? A sketch of Utilitarian and Natural Law arguments against 'Life Science Art.' anthropocentric considerations predominate as they do in many forms of Utilitarianism. It may be argued that, harm is admissible in some cases, when balanced by a greater good, or benefit. Accordingly, whether the use of animals in art or science should provoke ethical suspicion may be gauged by the relative harm or benefit the practice affords. This calculation is not always straightforward however, since one may ask 'benefit in relation to whom?' For the traditional Utilitarian, the calculation of benefit relied only on the consideration of human interests, but some Utilitarians, such as Peter Singer, wish to expand these considerations beyond the human sphere. Even Jeremy Bentham speculated as to whether future generations would consider animals' interests in moral calculus on the basis of their ability to suffer.
The connection of sentience, defined as the ability to feel pain, with moral standing is useful in that it appears to simplify matters somewhat.
31 Suffering is made possible by the presence of a nervous system which science declares most animals to have and plants not to have. Humans also recognise this instinctively as animal response to stimuli mirrors our own, allowing us to detect animal pleasure or pain. It follows that those with a central nervous system and thus sentience thereby have an interest in the harm or benefit they are afforded, and thus these interests should be given due consideration within any utilitarian calculus. The ability of animals to suffer is one reason why their use in the production of art warrants examination from a Utilitarian standpoint. Nonetheless, the Utilitarian critique presents difficulties of its own.
Firstly, it is difficult to weigh the conflicting interests of sentient beings (humans and animals) with any degree of accuracy. Deontologists and Utilitarians seem to appeal to this notion which lies at the heart of medieval metaphysics. For Kant this is because human beings are viewed as the only rational beings in a Kingdom of ends. In the case of Utilitarianism, it is due to the qualitative considerations employed in the calculus. In 'Human Body Worlds' people volunteer their corpses to the before they have died and in Marta de Menezes self portrait she used her own tissue.
If pigs could fly, should they?
If pigs could fly, should they? A sketch of Utilitarian and Natural Law arguments against 'Life Science Art.' some may baulk at the idea that 'Life Science Art' may be held to be ethically problematic at all. However, the fact that people treat animals inconsistently is no argument against the analysis of this treatment with an eye to improvement. That we generally care for the needs of our own children over the needs of those next door or in the global south is not an argument for the exploitation of the world's impoverished. Similarly, that we care for some animals and eat others is not an argument for 'Life Science Art'. Moreover, there seems to be a double standard in the deployment of cellular tissue depending on whether it is animal or human. If someone were to misappropriate a person's bone marrow for the use in an art project there would be a rightful public outcry, whereas if it is taken from a pig it is viewed as an interesting, if odd, idea. 'Life Science Art' did not create this moral inconsistency but has brought it into sharp relief. Even so, the morally permissible use of volunteered tissues is a matter of degree. The artist who cuts off his own arm to meet artistic goals would be looked upon as depraved as would an artist stealing others' tissue or body parts for inclusion in his works. 39 Thus, given that the claim that 'it is acceptable to use animals in scientific experiments' has been debunked, the stage is set for the challenge to the conclusion 'it is acceptable to use animals in art.' Consider the projects "Fish and Chips," "GFP Bunny" and "Pig Wings," discussed above. If we are to base ethical consideration on sentience, the question of whether the fish, rabbits or pigs used in 'Life Science Art' projects are in fact sentient arises first. The mere existence of the fish neurons, which were removed for one project, suggests the presence of a central nervous system and thus the ability to feel pain. The pig that had bone marrow removed was fully grown so clearly able to suffer. 40 The work of Professor Kac is slightly more problematic, however, since the use of newly fertilized rabbit ovum falls into the debate surrounding the ethics of reproductive techniques, a debate too complex to broach within the current context. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to propose that any harm 39 As occurred in England in 1998, when artist Anthony Noel-Kelly stole body parts from the Royal College of Surgeons. Kelly was the first British citizen to be convicted for the theft of human remains. Andrews, "Art as a Public Policy Medium". Chapter in a forthcoming book sent to the authors, 2003, pp. 19-20. 40 In fact, the operation procedure that apparently involved the use of anaesthetic attests to this. If pigs could fly, should they? A sketch of Utilitarian and Natural Law arguments against 'Life Science Art.' which may have been caused to these creatures, should they be at a developmental stage where pain can be perceived, this should be considered as part of the moral calculus, if one accepts the Utilitarian arguments resting on the notion that animals suffer. It seems that the conclusion 'it is acceptable to use animals in art' cannot be easily defended against Utilitarian considerations.
To move further along the argument in question, the premise that 'art is valued more highly than science' is also dubious. The value placed on art and science is different in kind -fine art is appreciated on a predominantly intrinsic level whereas science generally commends itself as instrumentally worthy. This of course must be qualified by the admission that these forms of value are not exclusive to either field: art can have instrumental significance in the case of didactic art and, in pure science, an investigation for its own sake has intrinsic worth and the simplicity of a scientific theory may be considered beautiful. The complexity of the way in which value is ascribed therefore, renders it extremely difficult to ascertain which of the two should be prized more highly. Thus, this argument sheds no light on whether the use of animals in art is appropriate.
41
The juxtaposition of the merits connected with the practice of science and art may cause further conceptual problems in relation to Life Science Art. Some branches of 'Life Science Art' seek to find value for its practice in so far as it promotes discussion or enables the development of procedural and evaluative guidelines. This line of reasoning seems to give this art form an instrumental value (as opposed to the generally accepted view of art as intrinsically worthy). This inadvertently implies that it is 'replaceable by anything else that performs the same function as well or better.'
42
Philosophical abstractions about the issues that 'Life Science Art' seeks to raise would accomplish the goals these artists strive for whilst avoiding the ethical dilemmas the art form invokes, and thus could be viewed as the better alternative, 41 Perhaps those forwarding this premise used an economic scale in their assessment of value, noting the ridiculous amounts of money spent to attain works of art. If, however, the millions of dollars spent each year on the products of science (cancer, AIDS or diabetes treatments; cars, aeroplanes, microwaves, cosmetics etc) is considered; it would seem that humanity values science more than art. So, even by this criterion, art is not clearly of such a high value as to warrant the use of animals in its production.
If pigs could fly, should they?
A sketch of Utilitarian and Natural Law arguments against 'Life Science Art.' making 'Life Science Art' superfluous. Since this 'social commentary' may be made without the recourse to harm, it is unreasonable that harm be tolerated.
In response to this, it may be asserted that although abstract reflection or debate can raise awareness of social and ethical issues, art is a 'particularly valuable way of conveying such an understanding, since it invokes and prescribes a peculiarly cognitive-affective response.'
43 Art is in a unique position to challenge and alter our 'cognitive-affective attitudes to, and understandings of, the world.' 44 Thus, on this view, the purpose (and hence the value) of 'Life Science Art' seems secure; except that the cognitive-affective response that this art evokes is misdirected. The value of art is attenuated when the moral effects are so 'crudely manifest' as to divert attention away from the content of the work. 45 The audience is not prompted to contemplate the broader implications of biological and genetic technological advance, but the problems posed by 'Life Science Art' itself. Therefore, it is questionable 'that it is shaping the public discourse about genetics and reproductive technologies.'
46

Admittedly, by 'imaginatively entering the world of a work, one is enabled to test one's reactions to people who hold sets of moral views very different from one's own.'
This is well and good when the work is fictional (such as a novel); but the trial of one's reactions takes on a certain urgency when otherwise. 47 For example, the examination of sexual brutality presented in de Sade's 'Justine' is permissible because it is fictional. 48 A real portrayal of this, however artistic, would most likely be deemed pornographic (hence not art in the received sense), and abhorrent. Art can be a vital medium in the exploration of societal values and morality, but it ceases to hold such value when its modus operandi is ethically amiss. Again, the means to challenging the conclusion 'it is acceptable to use animals in art' is easily realised. If pigs could fly, should they? A sketch of Utilitarian and Natural Law arguments against 'Life Science Art.' However, advocates of 'Life Science Art' reject the idea that their modus operandi is amiss asking: 'we use plants in artwork so why not animals?' 49 There is an obvious distinction between plants and animals that has, over the centuries, seen dinner tables adorned with flowers plucked from the garden as opposed to a limb pulled from the family pet. We see a likeness to ourselves in animals that is not perceptible in plants.
Comparisons can be made between humanity and non human animals, as noted above, on the basis of sentience, the ability to feel. Such a position would excuse the work of Amy Youngs' "Rearming the Spineless Opuntia" from further ethical scrutiny since this project involves the non-sentient living tissue of the cactus. However, the demarcation of ethical standing at sentience may itself seem arbitrary to some who would argue that the circle should be expanded further. If the demarcation between the moral worth of sentient and non-sentient beings is purely arbitrary, then surely it would follow that the distinction between the moral standing of human and non human animals (resting on some ill defined notion of personhood requiring rational thought for its fulfilment) is similarly arbitrary. If pigs could fly, should they? A sketch of Utilitarian and Natural Law arguments against 'Life Science Art.'
Natural Law Arguments
The foregoing discussion noted difficulties posed by the comparison of the interests of different beings, particularly in relation to suffering, and the criteria which may be employed in establishing comparison. However, the consideration of benefit and harm accorded to one animal by the effects of an act is similarly complex. Nevertheless, some clarity may be found if the problem is analysed from a Natural Law perspective.
For example, amputating an animal's leg is an obvious harm. If the leg was cancerous however, then this act is considered beneficial since it extends the animal's life. This particular assessment of benefit is in accordance with the 'Principle of Totality': that for harmful procedures to be ethical, they must contribute to the flourishing of the creature as a whole. 52 While an intended 'evil effect' will not be met with moral approval in this tradition (even if to bring about a greater good), it may be permitted, given that an act fulfils certain conditions. As Oderberg summarises: 53 1. The intentional act, which has an unintended yet foreseen evil effect, must be 'morally indifferent' in so far as it may be either good or at the very least permissible from a moral standpoint.
51
This principle states that it is 'permissible to sacrifice a part to save the whole. ' David Oderberg, Moral Theory, a Non-Consequentialist Approach, Blackwell, Oxford, 2000, p. 78 . By extension, it seems reasonable that it is permissible to sacrifice some smaller good with the intention of contributing to the greater good of an organism. If pigs could fly, should they? A sketch of Utilitarian and Natural Law arguments against 'Life Science Art.' 2. The 'good effect' must be caused directly by the intended action, not by the unintended yet foreseen evil side effect.
3. The evil effect must not be intended in addition to the good effect. That is, it is permissible that the evil effect is foreseen, but not wished for.
4. The 'Principle of Proportionality' must be adhered to, so that the evil effect is in proportion to, or is likely to be outweighed by, the good effect gained by the intended act. That is, there must be a 'sufficiently serious reason' to warrant permission of the evil effect.
In general, when speaking of 'Life Science Art', artistic and scientific exploration is the intended effect, and as noted, harm seems unintended (satisfying conditions 1 and 3). 54 Even if images of the surgery conducted on the pig to extract tissue for the "Pig
Wings" project leaves some room for doubt, harm still seems to be a foreseen yet unintended effect. 55 The 'good effect,' that is, the fulfilment of artistic endeavour, is caused directly by the intended action, not by the harm caused to the animals (which satisfies condition 2). Lastly, condition 4 must be answered: 'was there a sufficiently serious reason to allow these animals to be harmed?'
Firstly, the harm caused was not offset by any benefit for the animals concerned. The 'Principle of Double Effect' may allow these procedures to be conducted if the intended outcome was to improve the quality of the life of pigs (by offering them the ability to fly) or fish (by satiating their creative desire) in general, but this was not the intention of these projects. Secondly, these procedures were not conducted in order to promote the flourishing of these animals but to fulfil artistic goals and raise debate, which as a sufficiently serious reason to inflict harm is highly questionable. As If pigs could fly, should they? A sketch of Utilitarian and Natural Law arguments against 'Life Science Art.' telos to which the craftsperson is subject. The craftsperson exercises knowledgeable activity over a field for the sake of the goals of the particular craft. The importance of the argument lies in the notion that the standard of excellence in crafts is independent of the desires of the practitioner and is located in the "impersonal" sphere of whether the product of the craft achieves the goals of the craft activity. If we apply these considerations to Life Science Art we can see that at least some of the problematic features of 'Life Science Art' are related to the manner in which incommensurable goals become mixed. 'Life Science Art' neither fulfils the internal and impersonal criteria of art nor science. An argument can clearly be marshalled to foster the idea that science might employ techniques which, although morally problematic, nevertheless fulfil internal goods consistent with scientific tele. Thus, one might be able to use animals to help produce tangible goods for human beings by for example producing luminescent bunnies which may assist at some stage in the detection of human disease. However, if the questionable moral practice is used to produce objects for aesthetic experience then it can be argued that the tele of neither art nor science are promoted. It may be thought nevertheless that the telos of art is upheld in these practices. The problem however resides in the conflict between the goals of science and the goals of art. There does not appear to be a sufficiently serious reason to engage in 'Life Science Art' practices.
A still deeper reason for rejecting 'Life Science Art' resides in the religious metaphysic that undergirds the Thomistic perspective. At least some aspects of the Natural Law tradition depend on an underlying metaphysic and this is certainly the case with St Thomas. St Thomas noted that goodness is that which is desired, and that which is desired is so due to a participation in the perfect. Thus, once it is assumed that perfection is only meaningful when actual or existent, goodness can be neatly aligned with being.
59 From this perspective the Divine being creates a cosmos with certain definitive natural kinds. Human beings may interfere in this order through animal and plant husbandry for example but may not breach species essence. We can "create'" new forms of orchid or new breeds of dog but within the species and not trans-species. 'Life Science Art', however, seeks to do something, (at least in some
If pigs could fly, should they? A sketch of Utilitarian and Natural Law arguments against 'Life Science Art.' of its projects) which alters natural kinds beyond the possibilities inherent in their species nature. The argument then is that this is a frivolous intervention into the pattern of the Divinity's handiwork which is unwarranted because it does not have a sufficiently serious rationale. In 'Life Science Art' the fact that the material which is being moulded was initially moulded by the Divine, makes the imperfection of the work seem abhorrent. In other words, since 'Life Science Art' involves the living or the 'semi living,' the contrast between the work of these artists and the work of the Divine is brought into stark relief. Thus the creation of these 'semi living creatures' is but a cruel parody of Divine order.
The aims of this paper have been on the whole fairly modest. The issues that "Life Science Art" raise are clearly ethically problematic but the field is still so new and lacking in sustained philosophical reflection that this paper is targeted at bringing some of the issues into the philosophical arena. Further discussion and reflection is required and as the range of "Life Science Art's" projects continue to push the boundaries of our distinctions between science and art, together with their broader relations to the good and the beautiful, such discussion and reflection will require an increasing sense of urgency. Here we have focussed on some of the problems that arise when beauty and goodness come apart. In doing so we sketched some standard utilitarian considerations against "Life Science Art" mainly drawing upon the "harm" that is inflicted in some of these projects. Nevertheless, we also argue from the Natural Law tradition that there are relevant considerations of "harm" that go beyond the account presented in utilitarianism. We argue that there are ontological reasons for rejecting "Life Science Art" from a Natural Law perspective and that there are deeper issues about the relations of art and science, goodness and beauty which need further reflection and articulation.
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